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ABSTRACT
Caroline Marie Lancaster: Not So Radical After All: Ideological Diversity Among Radical Right
Voters and Its Implications for Party Competition
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe)
Traditionally, parties on the radical right in Western Europe have espoused socially conservative,
pro-family values, in addition to their authoritarian orientations. Radical right voters are assumed
to be similar. However, in light of more liberal radical right parties I ask, “What are the ideological
characteristics of radical right voters in Western Europe, and what are the implications of this for
party competition?” Using latent class analysis and the European Social Survey, I find that only a
minority of radical right voters conform to the traditional conceptualization. Second, I show that
radical right parties lose votes as their positions on social issues become more extreme and win
votes as their positions on immigration become more extreme. Finally, I find that more moderate
parties exist in countries with more moderate voters.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the last few decades, radical right parties have reappeared across Western Europe with
renewed vigor and popularity. Although almost every country in the region is home to at least
one radical right party, their success and popularity is far from uniform. These parties bear less
resemblance to one another, instead mirroring the countries within which they exist and operate.
Scholars of the radical right have tended to focus on the commonalities among those in this party
family, noting the xenophobia, nativism, and racism inherent to their ideologies. Fewer scholars
have looked past the commonalities and considered the variety among radical right parties and
voters.
In the past 10-15 years, an increasingly prevalent phenomenon has appeared among the West
European radical right – parties are softening their conservative and traditionalist positions on issues
of gender, sexuality, and the family. This is especially curious considering the “post-materialist”
cleavage and dealignment arguments, positing that these parties developed in reaction to the
extreme progressivism of green or new-left parties (Inglehart, 1977; Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al.,
2006; Bornschier, 2018; Hooghe and Marks, 2018). In this, a new politics dimension referred to
as “GAL-TAN” was mobilized (Hooghe et al., 2002).1 Others have labeled this cleavage variously
– “libertarianism-authoritarianism” (Kitschelt, 1995), “cosmopolitanism-parochialism” (Inglehart,
1977; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; De Vries, 2017) and “demarcation-integration” (Kriesi et al., 2006).
Notwithstanding this moderating phenomenon, the literature has largely continued to assume
that radical right parties are simply that – radically conservative and traditionalist – and that voters
are similar. Other than our perception of radical right voters as nativist, authoritarian, disaffected,
and marginalized by society, we know very little about the ideology of these voters. To shed light
1GAL-TAN stands for “green/alternative/libertarian – traditional/authoritarian/nationalist” and represents parties’
sociocultural positions (Hooghe et al., 2002)
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on this gap in the literature, I ask, “What are the ideological characteristics of radical right voters,
and what are the implications of this for party competition?”
In the same vein as (Spierings et al., 2017) who confirm the existence of “sexually-modern
nativists,” this study proposes the existence of different ideological classes of radical right voters,
finding that only a minority conform to the usual archetype of “conservative nativist” and that a
significant portion are indeed “progressive” on social issues other than immigration. In light of this,
it is reasonable to assume that the positions parties take on these issues have implications for their
success or failure, depending on the ideological makeup of their country. This article contributes not
only to the literature on radical right parties, but also to that on extremist parties and electoral and
ideological competition more broadly. This question is of vital importance as it will lead to a better
understanding of how radical right parties are adapting to a changing electorate and behaving in
ways that have been hitherto unexpected per the broader literature on this topic.
This article proceeds in two parts. First, using the 8th wave of the European Social Survey
(ESS) and latent class analysis, I identify four latent ideological classes among West European voters
as a whole and show how these classes are distributed among radical right voters. I also show how
these classes vary across countries and how individual-level demographic characteristics such as age,
education, gender, and income map onto them. Second, I examine how these ideological classes
interact with party ideology (using party position data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES))
and how this affects the success of radical right parties. I argue that radical right parties lose votes
from non-conservative voters as their positions become more extreme on social issues but that they
win votes as their immigration positions become more extreme. This suggests that spatial theory
may apply to secondary issues while a directional theory applies to primary issues. Evidence from
logistic regression models provides support for this argument.
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THE RADICAL RIGHT AND ITS VOTERS
Extant research on the ideology of the radical right has suffered a significant blind spot. With a
few exceptions (Spierings et al., 2017; Akkerman, 2015), radical right parties are assumed to be
conservative and traditionalist, as the name of the party family might suggest. These assumptions
harken back to the party family’s origins. Although Lipset and Rokkan (1967) predicted a “freezing”
of the West European party system in their book on cleavage theory and party system development,
this prediction was not borne out by the events of the second half of the 20th Century. While
previously the party system had been structured on class-based, economic – or materialist – cleavages,
the 1970s and 1980s saw the development of the post-materialist cleavage, which gave rise to green,
or new-left, parties (Rydgren, 2007). As (Inglehart, 1977) writes, this was a “silent revolution,”
involving a ”fundamental shift from ‘materialist’ values to ‘post-materialist values ... prioritiz[ing]
the expansion of individual freedom ... multiculturalism, gender and racial equality, and sexual
freedom.” Subsequently, the beginnings of the radical right’s rise to prominence began to take shape,
with these parties “demanding the protection of (patriarchal) family values and a nationally-oriented
immigrant-free way of life” (Meguid 2005, p.384; Kitschelt 1995).
The rise of the radical right in the aftermath of this shift led many to attribute cultural backlash
against this progressivism as a primary cause of the rise of the radical right (Inglehart, 1977;
Kriesi et al., 2008; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Bornschier, 2018). However, specific, empirically
testable factors have also been cited including expansion of higher education, economic and cultural
modernization, globalization, and electoral dealignment.
First, when examining the effect of education on voting behavior, it becomes clear that green
parties draw heavily from highly educated sectors of society. According to (Bornschier, 2018),
“the expansion of education could be considered a revolution similar to the national and industrial
revolutions that were at the center of Lipset and Rokkan’s model.” So-called “universalistic values”
became politicized during this time of “cultural modernization”, creating a new sociocultural
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dimension of conflict. Starting in the 1980s, radical right parties began exploiting voters at the other
side of this divide – those who are not highly educated (Kriesi et al., 2008; Bornschier, 2010, 2018).
However, lack of education is not the sole reason that voters became vulnerable to radical right
appeals. The process of dealignment was, according to some, a result of drastic changes to the
economy in the form of modernization (Kitschelt, 1995; Betz and Immerfall, 1998; Van der Brug
et al., 2005; Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014). Interestingly, proponents of this
approach posit materialist concerns as the cause of this new post-materialist cleavage. According to
this argument, the loss of manufacturing jobs resulting from the shift from an industrial economy
to a service economy created clear “winners” and “losers” of modernization. These “losers” –
primarily working class men – abandoned socialist and social democratic parties because these
parties began moving to the center to appeal to the growing middle class (Kriesi and Bornschier,
2012). Similar theories include “realistic group conflict” and the “status politics” approach (for
a review, see Arzheimer, 2018). The radical right’s anti-immigrant and anti-system appeals are
believed to resonate with these disaffected voters. As such, many of these “losers” are assumed to
support the radical right, since these parties seek to arrest the rapid change occuring in society.
However, scholars have not found clear empirical evidence in support of the economic modernization
argument. Globalization has also created “winners” and “losers”, but there is little evidence that
“globalization losers” comprise a significant radical right support base (see Bornschier, 2018).
Perhaps more promising is the “transnational cleavage” hypothesis (Hooghe and Marks, 2018).
By introducing cultural aspects, this approach conceptualizes “globalization” as encompassing more
than simply trade and economic policy. As (Hooghe and Marks, 2018) discuss, the Euro and refugee
crises have reinforced the importance of the GAL-TAN dimension to West European politics. They
relabel the post-materialist cleavage “transnational” because it pits issues of nationalism and the
autonomy of nation-states against immigration, European integration, and the accompanying loss
of agency to “foreigners” both inside and outside Europe. These issues are undeniably of great
concern to radical right parties, and this new emphasis on the integrity, or lack thereof, of the
nation-state is in line with numerous studies that show that anti-immigrant sentiment is a major
reason voters are drawn to the radical right (Lubbers et al., 2002; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003;
Norris, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2005; Cutts et al., 2011; Arzheimer, 2018). While this theory may
not explain the emergence of the sociocultural dimension of politics, it does offer an explanation
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for both why this dimension has remained salient and why radical right parties have shifted their
appeals in recent years. To illustrate how these appeals have changed, or not, overtime, in Figures
1–3, I present longitudinal radical right party positions on the three facets of TAN – social lifestyle
(T, traditionalism), civil liberties (A, authoritarianism), and immigration (N, nationalism). To aid
in comparison between the three positions, the y-axes are on the same scale.2
Figure 1: Social Lifestyle Position, 2002-2014
Figure 2: Civil Liberties Position, 2006-2014
2The 2002-3 data are from (Benoit and Laver, 2006)’s expert survey (a precursor to CHES) and are measured on a
0-20 scale where 0 is extremely supportive and 20 is extremely opposed. The 2006-2014 data are from CHES, which
measures these variables on a 0-10 scale, where 0 is extremely supportive and 10 is extremely opposed (Bakker et al.,
2015; Polk et al., 2017). I divided the (Benoit and Laver, 2006) scores by 2 to place them on the same scale as CHES.
The (Benoit and Laver, 2006) dataset does not contain civil liberties scores for 2002-3; therefore, this variable begins
in 2006. Parties chosen are West European radical right parties active for the entire 12 year period, with the exception
of UKIP, which is not measured in 2002-3. I treat the defunct LPF as functionally equivalent to its successor, PVV
(for further explanation, see (Akkerman, 2005)).
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Figure 3: Immigration Position, 2002-2014
From these figures, a few main observations should be noted. First, there is little variation in
immigration position overtime and across parties – these parties are strongly nativist across the
board. Civil liberties position is similar, though not as striking. Notable is the parties’ relative
convergence on this issue in 2014, however – perhaps related to the increased salience of immigration.
In contrast, social lifestyle position exhibits notable variation not only between parties but also
within parties. Party rhetoric and behavior corroborate this observation. For example, the Dutch
Party for Freedom (PVV) has been committed to gender equality and LGBT rights for much of its
existence, claiming this to be a bastion of Western society (Vossen, 2011). This is not unlike its
defunct predecessor, the Pim Fortuyn List, founded by the eponymous Pim Fortuyn, a xenophobic,
openly gay sociologist (Akkerman, 2005; Spierings et al., 2017). Further, then-leader of the Danish
People’s Party, Pia Kjærsgaard, once stated, “In Denmark we adhere to liberal values. We accept
and respect the choices people make. We accept homosexuality. In Iran you will be hanged for your
homosexuality” (Akkerman, 2015). As a specific example of a policy shift, Marine LePen, leader of
the French Front National, began to support civil partnerships during debates over the legalization
of same-sex marriage in 2012 (Akkerman, 2015).
As previous work has shown, the radical right is no longer uniformly “rightist” with regard to
economic policy. In fact, these parties frequently are ardent supporters of the welfare state (Mudde,
1999, 2007; Ennser, 2012). They also commonly choose to downplay economic issues since the
sociocultural dimension is their primary dimension of contestation (Rovny, 2013; Koedam, 2017).
As such, some scholars, such as (Marks et al., 2006), have begun to refer to these parties as “radical
TAN” rather than “radical right”. Although patriarchal traditionalism was indeed important in
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the 1980s and 1990s during the initial rise of this family, it has clearly become less of an issue in
recent years. According to the transnational cleavage argument, this is largely due to the increased
salience of the immigration issue. Thus, perhaps this family is moving towards “radical AN”.
In light of these party-level observations, how do voters compare? Ideologically, we know little
about radical right voters aside from their strong nativism. Can it be assumed that they are
conservative traditionalists reacting against “universalistic values”, or do they exhibit ideological
variation not unlike the parties they support?
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LATENT CLASS ANALYSIS
In order to examine the ideological characteristics of both Western Europe’s voters at large as well
as voters on the radical right, I employ a method known as latent class analysis (LCA), estimated
with the poLCA package in R. LCA is a type of structural equation modeling whereby unobserved
patterns (“classes”) in the data are uncovered (Oberski, 2016). Observations are “probabilistically
group[ed through maximum likelihood estimation] ... into a ‘latent class’, which in turn produces
expectations about how that observation will respond on each manifest variable” (Linzer et al.,
2011).3. LCA is similar to an ideal point model, such as that on which DW-NOMINATE is based,
except it assumes that the latent trait is categorical, rather than continuous (Linzer et al., 2011).
The number of classes the model estimates is chosen by the researcher, either through theoretical
expectation or model fit criteria. I determined that my model should estimate four classes because
it exhibited the lowest Baysian Information Criteria (BIC) as compared to other class number
specifications.4 LCA has been frequently used in public health and psychology research but has
only recently been applied to questions in political science (e.g. Blaydes and Linzer, 2008; Feldman
and Johnston, 2014; Alvarez et al., 2017).
As (Feldman and Johnston, 2014) show in their study of American voters’ ideologies, it is
dangerous to assume that party identification, or identification as “liberal” or “conservative”, holds
the same meaning for every individual. (Ellis and Stimson, 2012) concur. Much of this conceptual
confusion for voters is related to their attempts at placing themselves on a unidimensional ideological
scale, despite that political competition operates on at least two dimensions – economic and
sociocultural (Carmines and Stimson, 1981; Hooghe et al., 2002; Miller and Schofield, 2003; Feldman
3A manifest variable is an observed survey response. This is in contrast to a latent variable, which is unobserved.
4According to (Linzer et al., 2011), class number can be decided iteratively, by first fitting a model with two classes
and increasing class number by one “until a suitable fit is achieved” (p.6). A balance should be struck between under-
and over-fitting because although fit is generally improved as class number increases, the model eventually begins to
fit to noise. BIC is the recommended model fit criteria to consider because it measures not only how well a model
fits but also whether it may be over-fit through penalizing the model as the number of parameters increases. This
criterion indicates to the researcher which model is the most parsimonious.
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and Johnston, 2014).5 Should a libertarian place herself on the left or right? What about a
post-communist? Because there exist voters whose economic and social stances do not fit neatly
onto a unidimensional scale, it is not unreasonable to expect fairly significant heterogeneity within
broad ideological groupings or party families.
For these analyses, I utilized the 8th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), completed
in 2016 (NSD Norwegian Centre for Research Data, 2016). I included data from West European
countries available in the survey with a competing radical right party, for a total of 10 countries.6
The models were estimated using four survey questions and two covariates – age and level of
education. Age is a continous variable ranging from 15-100 and education was recoded to a 1-5
scale where 1 indicates an individual who has not completed high school and 5 indicates a holder
of a master’s, professional, or doctoral degree. The latent classes were estimated from questions
pertaining to social progressiveness and libertarianism.7 First, as an indicator of authoritarianism,
should rules be followed at all times, even if no one is watching? Second, are men more entitled
to jobs during an economic downturn than women? Third, should gays and lesbians be allowed
to adopt children? And finally, do immigrants undermine or enrich one’s country? For the first
question, respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale from 1-6, with low values indicating
agreement. The second and third questions were measured on a 1-5 scale, again with low values
indicating agreement. The final question asked respondents to indicate their beliefs on a 0-10 scale,
with low values representing a belief that immigrants undermine one’s country. I recoded this
variable to a 1-5 scale to better resemble the other three response structures. “Don’t know”s and
refusals were coded as missing.
Below I present my results from a latent class analysis on the full dataset (N = 18, 054).8 Four
latent classes emerge from the data, the largest of which is “moderates” at 35% of the sample.
These are individuals with no strong feelings regarding the four survey questions. 21% of voters are
“conservative nativists,” fairly authoritarian and traditionalist and opposing immigration. The final
5Multidimensional competition is widely recognized to exist in systems with a salient regionalism issue but appears
to be more contested in other systems. However, the notion that European party competition can often not be easily
reduced to unidimensionality has recently gained support. See (Elias et al., 2015; Rovny, 2015).
6Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United
Kingdom
7See Appendix 1 for exact question wordings and Appendix 3 for descriptive statistics.
8See Appendix 2 for full results.
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two categories are “progressives” and “pro-immigration progressives”, 19% and 25% respectively.
The main difference between these two classes is that the latter believe strongly that immigrants
enrich their country while the former take a more neutral stance.
Figure 4: Predicted Probability of Latent Class by Age, Full Sample
Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Latent Class by Education Level, Full Sample
As Figure 4 shows, at mean level of education, as age increases, the probability of being in the
conservative nativist and moderate classes increases. Conversely, older individuals have a very low
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probability of being in the progressive or pro-immigration progressive classes. Figure 5 indicates that
at age 50 (the sample mean), those with advanced degrees are more likely to be pro-immigration
progressives, while they are very unlikely to be progressives or conservative nativists. As the
literature predicts, individuals with low educational attainment are more likely to be conservative
nativists.
Figure 6: Latent Class Allocation by Country, Full Sample
Per Figure 6, latent class allocation varies by country. Countries such as France and Austria
have the largest percentage of voters in the conservative nativist class. The fewest of this type of
voter exist in the Netherlands and Sweden, where a majority of their populations fall into the two
progressive classes.
Next, to elucidate whether or not radical right voters concentrate in the conservative nativist
class, I subset the data to include only those individuals who indicated that they voted for a radical
right party in their country’s last election. As Table 1 shows, almost 43% of radical right voters
comply with the radical right protoype of “conservative nativist,” about a two-fold increase from the
percentage in the full dataset. However, percentages of radical right voters falling into the moderate
and progressive classes are comparable to the respective percentages of voters in the full dataset.
Unsurprisingly, there are very few pro-immigration progressives among radical right voters; the fact
that any appear at all is likely due to measurement and prediction errors, the latter of which is due
to the fact that the model can only estimate an individual’s probable, not actual, class membership.
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Table 1: Weighted Latent Class Percentages
Latent Class Radical Right % Full %
Conservative Nativists 42.82% 20.42%
Moderates 33.38% 34.55%
Progressives 20.48% 19.37%
Pro-Immigration Progressives 3.32% 25.66%
Because the literature finds that women are more likely than men to hold progressive social
stances (Dolezal, 2010), in Figure 7, I present latent class by gender for radical right voters. Most
notably, a larger proportion of women are progressives than men, who are more likely to be either
moderate or conservative nativist. Although women are less likely to vote for the radical right than
men (Immerzeel et al., 2015), women comprise about 1/3 of the weighted sample. Thus, women are
not rare in this subset, and this finding is likely not an artefact of the data.
Figure 7: Latent Class Allocation by Gender, Radical Right Subset
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Figure 8: Latent Class Allocation by Income, Radical Right Subset
Further, since the literature has argued that the radical right is heavily supported by working
class men, Figure 8 illustrates latent class among radical right voters at various levels of household
income, with 1 being the lowest value. Although conservative nativists are more likely to be found
at lower levels of income, there is no clear trend.
Figure 9: Latent Class Allocation by Country, Radical Right Subset
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Finally, I again present latent class allocation by country in Figure 9.9 The results largely mirror
those in Figure 6 above – the Netherlands and Sweden have the fewest conservative nativists while
Austria and France have the most, suggesting that the ideological distribution of radical right voters
is not wholly distinct from that of voters on the whole.
9Because I include only one radical right party per country, this figure equivalently shows latent class by party. For
included parties and further explanation, see Appendix 3.
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PARTY COMPETITION
The literature on radical right party success has heavily emphasized electoral system context.
(Lubbers et al., 2002) contend that micro-level indicators such as educational attainment, gender,
and anti-immigrant sentiment are fairly invariant cross-nationally and that the differences in radical
right vote share stem from country-level contextual factors such as whether center-right parties
have taken on nativist stances. (Van der Brug et al., 2005) concur, arguing that radical right party
success “will depend on the competition they face from large (right-wing) parties” (p. 548). Since
larger parties generally are more successful policy-wise, the extent to which voters will choose a
smaller radical right party depends on how outspoken the center-right appears to be regarding
immigration (see also Pardos-Prado, 2015).
However, how does radical right success interact with voter ideology, and are these effects
conditioned on parties’ distance from their center-right competitors? (Spierings et al., 2017) argued
that “sexually modern nativists” will be more likely to vote for radical right parties that take on
more moderate positions on LGBT rights. Such a logic is undergirded by the spatial model, since
moderate positions are assumed to be optimal (Downs, 1957). However, this hypothesis was not
confirmed. As the authors discuss in their conclusion, this is likely due to not taking into account the
positions of parties’ center-right competitors, as voters may be inclined to choose a more moderate
center-right party provided this party has taken on a nativist stance. Following from (Pardos-Prado,
2015), instead of absolute party position, I use radical right parties’ position distance from their
center-right competitor as a measure of relative extremism. Figures 10 and 11 suggest that there
appears to be a negative relationship between vote share and position distance on social lifestyle
and GAL-TAN.
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Figure 10: Correlation between Social Lifestyle Distance and Radical Right Vote Share
Figure 11: Correlation between GAL-TAN Distance and Radical Right Vote Share
Because a majority of radical right voters are not conservative nativists, I argue that as a party’s
ideology becomes more distant from their center-right competitor, they can expect to lose votes
from moderates and progressives and gain votes from conservative nativists. I also argue that as a
radical right party’s distance on immigration from their center-right competitor increases, it can
expect to gain votes. Because of the increased salience of immigration in recent years (Hooghe
and Marks, 2018), taking an extreme stance on this issue offers a signal to voters that the radical
right is more credible on this issue than other parties, in line with the directional theory of issue
voting (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989). From the discussion thus far, I formulate the following
hypotheses:
H1: As ideological distance on social issues between a radical right party and their center-right
competitor decreases, radical right parties can be expected to win more votes.
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H2: As ideological distance on immigration issues between a radical right party and their center-right
competitor increases, radical right parties can be expected to win more votes.
H3a: As ideological distance on social issues between a radical right party and their center-
right competitor decreases, radical right parties can be expected to win more votes from progressives
and moderates.
H3b: As ideological distance on social issues between a radical right party and their center-
right competitor increases, radical right parties can be expected to win more votes from conservative
nativists.
To test these hypotheses, I now proceed with logistic regression analyses predicting radical right
vote. From the above analysis, I obtained a predicted latent class for each individual in my dataset,
included as a factor variable with “progressive” as the reference category. In order to determine
how a radical right party’s relative position vis-a-vis a center-right alternative affects the choice to
vote radical right, I use party position variables from the 2014 CHES wave – social lifestyle, civil
liberties, immigration, and GAL-TAN (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). I transformed these
positions into distances by subtracting a country’s center-right party’s position from that of the
country’s radical right party.10 I control for gender, age, and education level (reference category is
“did not complete high school”) in Models 1–4. However, because I include latent class variables in
Models 5–8, I only include gender as a control because age and education were covariates in my
latent class analysis and thus have already been controlled for (Linzer et al., 2011).
Several findings emerge from Table 2. First, as the literature predicts, women are less likely to
vote radical right than men. Second, as education level increases, an individual becomes less and
less likely to vote for a radical right party. Interestingly, moderates seem slightly less likely to vote
radical right than progressives while conservative nativists, unsurprisingly, are more likely.
10See Appendix 3 for parties and descriptive statistics.
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Finally, what role does party position play in vote choice? As Models 1 and 5 show, as distance
on social lifestyle increases, the likelihood of voting radical right decreases. In Models 2 and 7, I find
a similar, yet stronger result for GAL-TAN distance. Both of these findings provide support for H1.
Contrary to expectations in H2, immigration distance is not significant and takes on opposing signs
in Models 3 and 7. However, it does attain significance in Model 8 and has a positive coefficient, as
hypothesized. Further corroboration for this result is found in Models 4 and 8 in the interaction
between social lifestyle distance and immigration distance. Figure 12 provides an interpretation
of this result. As shown, at the lowest value of social lifestyle distance (top line), parties have a
greater baseline probability of receiving votes compared to at higher values (H1), and this effect is
amplified as immigration distance increases (H2). However, it should be noted that the opposite
effect exists at the maximum value of social lifestyle distance – vote share decreases as immigration
distance increases. A cautious interpretation of the evidence undergirding the immigration distance
hypothesis is that parties gain votes by taking a more distant position only when this is accompanied
by more moderate positions on social lifestyle.
Taken together, the results from Table 2 suggest that radical right parties are punished electorally
for taking positions on social lifestyle that are seen as too extreme or out of sync compared to
the right more broadly, as hypothesized. Such a result complies with the spatial model of voting.
However, my finding regarding immigration distance contradicts spatial theory, aligning more with
directional theory – parties seem to gain more votes by taking extreme positions because voters
with a strong interest in immigration restrictions will be inclined choose the party that takes “the
most extreme position in the direction of that preference” (Rabinowitz and Macdonald, 1989, p.108)
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Figure 12: Predicted Probability Plot – Social Lifestyle Dist.* Immigration Dist.
I test hypotheses H3a and H3b in Table 3. Here, I interact social lifestyle distance with latent
class. As shown in Figure 13, at low social lifestyle distance (top line), there is a greater probability
of radical right vote across the board. However, at higher values, conservative nativists have the
highest probability of voting radical right, providing support for both of these hypotheses.
Figure 13: Predicted Probability Plot – Latent Class * Social Lifestyle Dist.
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Table 3: Multilevel Logistic Regression with Country Random Effects
Dependent variable: Radical Right Vote
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Female −0.506∗∗∗ −0.505∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Social Lifestyle Dist. −0.782∗∗∗
(0.160)
Immigration Dist. −0.007
(0.137)
GAL-TAN Dist. −0.965∗∗∗
(0.237)
Latent Class
Conservative Nativist 0.008 0.024 −0.119
(0.306) (0.253) (0.405)
Moderate −0.985∗∗∗ −0.396 −0.991∗∗
(0.337) (0.261) (0.460)
Pro-immigration Progressive −2.392∗∗∗ −2.111∗∗∗ −1.954∗
(0.722) (0.522) (1.109)
Interactions
Soc. Life.*Con. 0.235∗
(0.139)
Soc. Life.*Mod 0.261∗
(0.149)
Soc. Life.*Pro-Im. −0.027
(0.341)
Imm.*Con. 0.142∗∗
(0.069)
Imm.*Mod. −0.008
(0.069)
Imm.*Pro-Im. −0.089
(0.137)
GAL-TAN*Con. 0.273
(0.178)
GAL-TAN*Mod 0.245
(0.197)
GAL-TAN*Pro-Im. −0.215
(0.488)
Constant −0.674∗ −2.477∗∗∗ −0.161
(0.375) (0.534) (0.578)
Observations 15,096 15,096 15,096
Log Likelihood −2,797.105 −2,800.961 −2,798.439
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,614.209 5,621.922 5,616.877
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 5,690.431 5,698.144 5,693.099
Note: Reference category is “progressive”; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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In order to further test how party position affects voters, I turn again to my radical right subset.
Because of the small number of pro-immigration progressives in this sample, I removed these 23
observations. In Table 4, I present results from multinomial logistic regression models predicting
radical right latent class with party distance variables. As above, I do not control for age and
education since these variables were included in the latent class analysis. These results further
corroborate the evidence presented above. First, as Model 12 shows, compared to conservative
nativists, progressive radical right votes are more likely to be found supporting those parties with
lower values of social lifestyle distance, providing evidence to support H3a (see Figure 14). Second,
for both moderates and progressives, there is negative coefficient on immigration distance, suggesting
that these two groups are less likely to support radical right parties that take more distant positions
on immigration (see Figure 15). However, as shown above, this effect is likely mediated by social
lifestyle distance. Finally, and surprisingly, GAL-TAN distance is positive and significant for
moderates, suggesting that as distance increases, moderates are more likely than conservatives to
vote radical right. This result is contrary to expectations and contrary to evidence presented above,
warranting further attention in a future study.
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Figure 14: Predicted Probability of Latent Class over Values of Social Lifestyle Distance
Figure 15: Predicted Probability of Latent Class over Values of Immigration Distance
On the whole, my evidence suggests that these parties garner more votes when taking more
moderate positions on social issues and more extreme positions on immigration, but this is conditioned
by the ideological makeup of their countries. The three parties with the lowest social lifestyle
distances are the French Front National (FN), the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands (PVV),
and the Sweden Democrats (SD).11 Referring back to Figure 9, we see that these countries are also
the three with the largest proportion of progressive radical right voters. Taken with the results
from my full logistic regression analyses (Tables 2 and 3), it seems that radical right parties face a
trade-off when deciding which constituencies to court. For example, when FN decided to support
11See Appendix 3
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civil partnerships for gay and lesbian couples, they likely made themselves vulnerable to losing
votes from their more conservative supporters. However, the vote loss could be offset by the party
opening itself to a new, more progressive base. In some cases, such as with the Netherlands and
Sweden, there truly are fewer conservative nativists than elsewhere (see Figure 6) and moderating
would likely have less of a negative effect. In France, the opposite is true – along with Austria, it is
the country with the most conservative nativists. The fact that FN is moderating in such a climate
is perhaps surprising. In this case, we can speculate that French conservative nativists may turn to
other parties.
25
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Is there ideological diversity among radical right voters? This article answers with a resounding
“yes”. Across the countries examined in this study, conservative nativists comprise only a minority of
radical right voters, which corroborates a previous study of the “progressive nativist” phenomenon
(Spierings et al., 2017). Second, by examining latent voter ideology and party position distance, I
find that radical right parties that take on more extreme ideological positions on social issues likely
lose votes from all but their most conservative constituencies. I also find that extreme stances on
immigration lead to more votes not in isolation but rather in the presence of moderate social stances.
These results suggest that directional theory may apply more to primary issues while spatial theory
applies to less important issues. Finally, I find that more moderate parties, such as the PVV and
SD, are more likely to exist in countries with more moderate voters, such as the Netherlands and
Sweden. In deciding whether or not to moderate, radical right parties are faced with a trade-off – is
it more preferable to lose conservative voters or gain moderate and progressive ones? The answer to
this question is conditioned upon the country’s ideological makeup and the way these country-level
characteristics are reflected in the party landscape.
In 1995, Kitschelt argued that the radical right’s “winning formula” was economic neoliberalism
combined with sociocultural authoritarianism. Previous studies have shown that pro-welfare state
stances on the part of radical right parties are increasingly common, chipping away at the economic
side of the formula (Mudde, 2007). This article brings new evidence against the sociocultural aspect
– parties that maintain extreme sociocultural stances seem to be at a disadvantage. This may be
a result of the increased salience of immigration and the “transnational cleavage” (Hooghe and
Marks, 2018). This disadvantage may be compounded in the future if younger radical right voters
remain progressive as they age (see Figure 4). In light of this evidence, I concur with (Pardos-Prado,
2015) who stated that radical right parties “are better off by minimizing old ideological dimensions
and only stressing a cultural framing of immigration” (p. 366). Thus, future research on this topic
26
could focus on the salience of issues. Do radical right voters actually care about issues other than
immigration? If not, what is the utility in parties maintaining comprehensive platforms?
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONS
• ESS H1 – (Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and
tell me how much each person is or is not like you.) H1G – He believes that people should
do what they’re told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is
watching.
• ESS B33a – When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
• ESS B36 – Gay male and lesbian couples should have the same rights to adopt children as
straight couples.
• ESS B42 – Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched
by people coming to live here from other countries?
28
APPENDIX 2: LATENT CLASS MODEL RESULTS
Table 5: Full Sample
Progressives Moderates Con. Nativists Pro-Im. Progressives
Rules
1 (Strongly agree): 0.0595 0.0520 0.1550 0.0585
2: 0.1907 0.3024 0.3170 0.1685
3: 0.2134 0.2527 0.1842 0.2092
4: 0.2288 0.1894 0.1217 0.2009
5: 0.2268 0.1774 0.1514 0.2522
6: 0.0807 0.0261 0.0706 0.1108
Jobs
1 (Strongly agree): 0.0082 0.0009 0.0516 0.0043
2: 0.0049 0.0426 0.1579 0.0024
3: 0.0475 0.1190 0.1446 0.0064
4: 0.2179 0.5336 0.2480 0.1047
5: 0.7216 0.3038 0.3979 0.8823
Adoption
1 (Strongly agree): 0.5954 0.0115 0.1056 0.5834
2: 0.2908 0.4537 0.1649 0.2617
3: 0.0475 0.1190 0.1446 0.0064
4: 0.0000 0.2739 0.2417 0.0362
5: 0.0188 0.0304 0.3196 0.0382
Immigrants
1 (Undermine): 0.0674 0.0086 0.1702 0.0000
2: 0.1229 0.1067 0.2341 0.0000
3: 0.3147 0.3162 0.2927 0.0444
4: 0.2857 0.3735 0.1901 0.2623
5: 0.2093 0.1950 0.1129 0.6933
Predicted Probability: 0.2093 0.3059 0.2478 0.2369
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APPENDIX 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 6: Parties and Position Distances
Country Radical Right Center-Right Soc. Life. Dist. GAL-TAN Dist. Im. Dist. Civ. Lib. Dist.
Austria FPO¨ O¨VP 2.11 1.60 3.78 2.50
Belgium VB CD&V 3.40 3.40 4.20 3.60
Finland PS KESK 2.37 2.11 3.37 2:37
France FN UMP 1.36 1.75 2.20 1.83
Germany AfD CDU 2.93 2.69 3.57 2.35
Netherlands PVV VVD 1.49 2.65 2.37 1.55
Norway FrP — — — —
Sweden SD KD 1.98 2.28 7.16 2.45
Switzerland SVP — — — — —
United Kingdom UKIP Cons. 3.64 3.14 2.00 1.43
Denmark, Italy, and Greece were excluded because they do not appear in the 8th wave of the
ESS. Norway and Switzerland were excluded from the logistic regressions because they do not appear
in the CHES prior to 2014. Two countries in the dataset are home to two radical right parties, as
coded by CHES – Austria (BZO¨) and Germany (NDP). These parties received smaller vote shares
than the major radical right parties (FPO¨ and AfD) and also are qualitatively different from other
parties in the dataset – BZO¨ is a moderate splinter from FPO¨, and NPD is a neo-fascist party.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics, Full Dataset
Variable n Min q1 Median Mean q3 Max SD IQR
Rules 15,096 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.4 5.0 6.0 1.4 3.0
Jobs 15,096 1.0 4.0 5.0 4.3 5.0 5.0 0.9 1.0
Adopt 15,096 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.4 3.0 5.0 1.3 2.0
Immigration 15,096 1.0 3.0 4.0 3.6 5.0 5.0 1.2 2.0
Gender 15,096 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 0.5 1.0
Education 15,096 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.6 4.0 5.0 1.3 2.0
Age 15,096 15.0 35.0 51.0 49.9 65.0 100.0 18.6 30.0
Vote 15,096 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 2.0 0.2 0.0
Latent Class 15,096 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.8 4.0 4.0 1.1 2.0
GAL-TAN Pos. 15,096 7.8 8.7 8.9 8.9 9.1 9.3 0.4 0.4
Civ. Lib. Pos. 15,096 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.3 0.3 0.6
Soc. Life. Pos. 15,096 3.7 8.0 8.1 7.8 8.5 9.1 1.5 0.5
Im. Pos. 15,096 9.0 9.3 9.8 9.6 9.9 10.0 0.3 0.6
GAL-TAN Dist. 15,096 1.6 1.8 2.7 2.5 2.7 3.4 0.6 0.9
Im. Dist. 15,096 2.0 2.2 3.6 3.5 3.8 7.2 1.4 1.6
30
Civ. Lib. Dist 15,096 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.3 2.5 3.6 0.6 0.6
Soc. Life. Dist. 15,096 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.9 3.6 0.8 1.0
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics, Radical Right Subset
Variable n Min q1 Median Mean q3 Max SD IQR
Rules 797 1.0 2.0 3.0 3.4 5.0 6.0 1.5 3.0
Jobs 797 1.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 5.0 5.0 1.1 1.0
Adopt 797 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.9 4.0 5.0 1.4 2.0
Immigration 797 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.4 3.0 5.0 1.2 2.0
Gender 797 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 2.0 2.0 0.5 1.0
Education 797 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 5.0 1.0 1.0
Age 797 15.0 35.0 50.0 49.6 63.0 95.0 17.5 28.0
Latent Class 797 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 0.7 1.0
GAL-TAN Pos. 797 7.8 8.7 8.8 8.8 9.1 9.3 0.4 0.4
Civ. Lib. Pos. 797 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.3 0.3 0.6
Soc. Life. Pos. 797 3.7 8.0 8.2 7.8 8.9 9.1 1.7 0.9
Im. Pos. 797 9.0 9.6 9.8 9.7 9.9 10.0 0.3 0.3
GAL-TAN Dist. 797 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.7 3.4 0.5 0.9
Im. Dist 797 2.0 2.2 3.4 3.4 3.8 7.2 1.4 1.6
Civ. Lib. Dist. 797 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.2 2.5 3.6 0.5 0.7
Soc. Life. Dist 797 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.1 2.4 3.6 0.7 0.9
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